One of my internet-exposed inference honeypots was discovered, relabeled with sought-after model names, and incorporated into infrastructure apparently used to provide "free" LLM backends. It then received a real coding-agent session — history, filesystem output, working paths, and the agent's local tool manifest. The honeypot did not request or cause any tool execution; what the request exposed is what a malicious operator in that position could do.
The Coding-Agent Trap: When a "Free" LLM Endpoint Is the Adversary, (Mon, Aug 31st)
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Metadaten
- Original (extern): Link oeffnen
- Veroeffentlicht: 2026-08-31 20:00 UTC
- Importiert: 2026-09-08 18:19 UTC
- Quelle-ID:
sans_isc - uid_hash:
a72e40a2c190c987431e6fbc3b7e3a75181810fcf1570460eb548770413fc922
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SANS Internet Storm Center | security_news | - | de | https://isc.sans.edu/rssfeed.xml |